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All Observational Studies 15 resources found.


  1.  
  2. Source: Billings, C.E. (1996). Human-Centered Aviation Automation: Principles and Guidelines. NASA Technical Memorandum 110381. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "This document presents principles and guidelines for human-centered automation in aircraft and in the aviation system. Drawing upon operational experience with highly automated aircraft, it describes classes of problems that have occurred in these vehicles, the effects of advanced automation on the human operators of the aviation system, and ways in which these problems may be avoided in the design of future aircraft and air traffic management automation. Many incidents and a few serious accidents suggest that these problems are related to automation complexity, autonomy, coupling, and opacity, or inadequate feedback to operators. An automation philosophy that emphasizes improved communication, coordination and cooperation between the human and machine elements of this complex, distributed system is required to improve the safety and efficiency of aviation operations in the future."
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  3.  
  4. Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Considering temporal aspects for the design of humancomputer collaboration: identifying suitable foci. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/chi%20time%20ws%202004.pdf.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "In this paper, we discuss the various foci that can be taken to model temporal task aspects in complex dynamic work settings, and relate these to the concept of human-computer collaboration. We are aiming to identify time-related aspects that are central to inform effective design in time- and safety-critical domains such as aviation, where pilots interact very closely with highly automated systems that often modify pilots’ tasks and roles, thus requiring new insights into the resulting interaction."
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  5.  
  6. Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "We examined how increasing levels of cockpit automation affect the amount of time pilots spent performing various activities. Pilots’ activities were recorded every 7.5 s in four different aircraft during revenue flying. Two of the aircraft were Boeing 737-200’s and two were Boeing 737-300’s. The amount of time pilots spent hand flying the aircraft decreased with increasing automation, but otherwise the level of automation had little effect on the proportion of time pilots spent communicating or performing other procedural and housekeeping activities."
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  7.  
  8. Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "We examined how the frequency of 23 activities varied as a function of the level of cockpit automation. The pilots’ activities were recorded in actual revenue-generating line operations at 7.5 s intervals during climbs and descents during 193 flights in two models of the B737-200 and in two models of the B737-300. Eight of the 23 activities were assumed not to be affected by the duration of the climbs and descents and were analyzed using analysis of variance. The observed frequencies of the other 15 activities were analyzed using the length of the climb and descent as a covariate. The results showed that the frequency of housekeeping activities and communication activities tended not to be affected by the level of cockpit automation. In contrast, the frequency of most of the activities related to flight path control varied with the level of cockpit automation."
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  9.  
  10. Source: Hughes, D. (March 23, 1992). Automated Cockpits: Keeping Pilots in the Loop - Pilots support 767 automated cockpit, but cite mismatch with ATC system. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 52-55.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "This Aviation Week & Space Technology editor visited TWA and Air Canada training centers in St. Louis and Toronto and flew the Boeing 767 jump seat, including two North Atlantic crossings. Air Canada operates the 767-200 and -200ER with Pratt & Whitney engines and has -300s on order. TWA operated the -200ER, also with Pratt & Whitney engines." The author discusses his visit to the training center and the flights on which he road jumpseat."
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  11.  
  12. Source: Norman, S.D. & Orlady, H.W. (1988). Flightdeck Automation: Promises and Realities. Final Report of a NASA/FAA Industry Workshop. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "The material presented at this workshop provided a particularly comprehensive and broad overview of automation in the air transport system today. It is, therefore, not easy to select the most important points from the workshop and prepare conclusions. This section will focus on the major, global themes. ... A very condensed summary of the major ideas and concepts presented in the panels and papers is given here in order to form a basis for the conclusions."
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  13.  
  14. Source: Orlady, H.W. (1989). Training for advanced cockpit technology aircraft. In Proceedings of the Second Regional Safety Foundation Workshop sponsored by China Airlines and the Flight Safety Foundation, March 3-4, 1989, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: A presentation in which the author discusses training issues for advanced technology aircraft. His observations are based on training experience with the U.S. pilot population.
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  15.  
  16. Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "To complement the data gathered through pilot reports, we observed the behavior of experienced pilots who were in the process of transitioning to the B-737-300 aircraft. This transition training involves classroom, computer-based training (CBT), LOS (line-oriented simulation) sessions on a fixed-base trainer, and LOFT (line-oriented flight training) sessions on full-mission simulators. At the end of training, pilots take a 4-hr simulator check-ride in which they have to demonstrate that they are proficient in the following autoflight systems operations: Active Data Base Check, FMS and Performance Initialization, Flight Plan Entry, Direct To/Intercept Leg To, Holding Pattern, Installing an Approach, Closing a Route Discontinuity, and MCP (Mode Control Panel) Speed Interventions. We observed 10 pilot crews during fifteen LOS sessions with 6 different scenarios during transition on a fixed-base B-737-300 trainer ... Each of the observed LOS sessions requires 3 hours to complete. As in line operations, one of the pilots is assigned the role of pilot-flying, the other carries out the tasks of the pilot-not-flying. From time to time, the simulation is interrupted by the instructors to ask questions or discuss the flight situation with the pilots. The simulation scenarios consist of a complete flight, including cockpit setup, takeoff and landing, and they are designed to cover predefined sets of objectives emphasizing FMS operations. Abnormal and increasingly difficult situations such as system failures are introduced at the later stages of training. Throughout each LOS session, an observer was present (the first author) who was knowledgeable about both the scenarios and the FMS procedures and activities required to handle each scenario. The observer collected two types of data. First, she encoded crew-FMS interactions - the methods used to carry out given tasks and errors or difficulties that occurred. A second source of data was the discussion between the instructor and the crew which occurred during the scenario and after the scenario was completed."
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  17.  
  18. Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "The investigators observed the behavior of 10 crews of experienced pilots transitioning to the B737-300. During the simulator sessions the investigators observed crew behavior and encoded crew-FMS interactions. After each session they observed crew-instructor discussions and recorded relevant information concerning knowledge gaps and misconceptions."
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  19.  
  20. Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1995). How in the World Did We Ever Get into That Mode? Mode Error and Awareness in Supervisory Control. Human Factors, 37(1), 5-19.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "Mode error has been discussed in human-computer interaction for some time; however, the increased capabilities and the high level of autonomy of new automated systems appear to have created new types of mode-related problems. We explore these new aspects based on results from our own and related studies of human-automation interaction. In particular, we draw on empirical data from a series of studies of pilot-automation interaction in commercial glass cockpit aircraft to illustrate the nature, circumstances, and potential consequences of mode awareness problems in supervisory control of automated resources."
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  21.  
  22. Source: Speyer, J.J. & Fort, A.P. (1983). Communications: Major Human Factor in Cockpit Design. SAE Technical Paper Series. Long Beach, CA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "The present paper presents AIRBUS INDUSTRIE dedicated philosophy with respect to new cockpit technology in view of high quality communications. ... [This paper discusses] some examples of the progress brought to cockpit communications by the FFCC [Forward Facing Crew Cockpit] flightdeck."
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  23.  
  24. Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Crew coordination and training in the advanced technology cockpit. In Wiener, E.L. , Kanki, B.G., & Helmreich, R.L. (Eds.), Cockpit resource management, 199-229. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: Author writes of his observation made in a glass cockpit aircraft departing from San Jose, California (SJC) for a southeastern destination.
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  25.  
  26. Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "This report examines the management of human error in the cockpit. ... The author stresses 'intervention strategies', various means of error management by intervening into the system. A distinction is made between two models of intervention, those directed toward a very specific and well-defined human error (e.g. wrong runway landings), and those directed toward less defined, often vague sources of error (e.g. complacency, fatigue). Fifteen guidelines for the design and implementation of intervention strategies are included." To illustrate his concepts, the author uses ASRS incident reports as examples of various errors.
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  27.  
  28. Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: This is "a summary of a two year study that investigated the impact of automation in corporate aviation cockpits. ... The approach followed in this study emulated previous work in the air carrier environment (e.g., Wiener, 1989). In general the study used three data collection techniques to cover all aspects of automation and corporate cockpits. They were: Questionnaires, Flight observations, Simulator observations" "Two workshops were held, one near the end of each year in the project. The purpose of the workshops were to provide the investigators a 'reality check' of their conclusions by the pilots who deal with the systems every day." ... Phase I Workshop was "a two-day workshop was held at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL on 27-28 July, 1992. Attendees of the workshop included six pilots from a variety of corporate aviation departments ..., the FAA project manager, the project staff, and student assistants. ... The purpose of the workshop was to present and discuss the preliminary findings of the first phase, and discuss the second year of the project"
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  29.  
  30. Source: Woods, D.D. (1993). Price of flexibility in intelligent interfaces. Knowledge-Based Systems, 6(4)., 189-196.
    Source Type:   Observation
    Synopsis: "Flexibility and customizability are central to the perceived advantages of the growth in technological powers. However, these and other vectors of technological change, when used clumsily, create new burdens and complexities for beleaguered human practitioners responsible for achieving goals with some field of activity. 'Intelligent interfaces' are sometimes seen as solutions to the growing demands of highly technological and highly automated fields of activity. However, data from a variety of sources indicates that an exclusively technology-driven approach to the development of intelligent interfaces is likely to provide the illusion of assistance while creating a new layer of burdens and complexities. ... My colleagues and I have been investigating the impact of technology on practitioner performance through multiple studies carried out in different domains, with different types of practitioner and different types of new technology: AI based aids for the fault management of space systems, control automation on the flightdeck in commercial aviation, and information technology for the anesthetic management of patients during surgery in operating rooms. These studies have revealed a variety of ways in which the clumsy use of technology creates new complexities that increase the potential for erroneous assessments and actions under certain circumstances and, given the presence of other factors, creates new paths to system breakdown. In addition, these studies shed some light on how technology can be used 'intelligently', or, more accurately, used skillfully, to provide practitioners with cognitive instruments. This research base will be used to explore what is needed to use technological flexibilities and powers skillfully, as opposed to clumsily, so as to increase the range of practitioner adaptive response to the variability resident in the field of activity."
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