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All Evidence from Observational Studies 47 matching pieces of evidence found.


  1.  
  2. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "As has been noted, today's tightly coupled automation systems have become extremely complex and in many cases, relatively opaque to their operators. At the same time, these systems have limits which may or may not be clear to their operators. An example of the problems that can be created is seen in this information, extracted form a 1991 incident report: 'Flight XXX departed on schedule; heavy rain and gusty winds were experienced on takeoff and during the departure. The climbout was normal until approximately FL 240 when numerous caution/warning messages began to appear, indicating a deteriorating mechanical condition. The first ... was OVHT ENG 1 NAC, closely followed by BLEED DUCT LEAK L, ENG 1 OIL PRESSURE, FLAPS PRIMARY, FMC L, STARTER CUT OUT 1, and others. #1 generator tripped off line and the #1 engine amber "REV" indication appeared. However, no yaw control problems were noted. The maximum and minimum speed references on the airspeed (tape) came together, followed by stick shaker activation. At approximately FL 260, the cabin was climbing rapidly and could not be controlled. The Captain initiated an emergency descent and turnback to the departure airport. The crew began to perform emergency procedures and declared an emergency. During the descent, the stick shaker activated several times but ceased below FL 200. Due to the abnormal flap indication and the #1 engine reverse, airspeed during the descent was limited to 260-270 knots. The Captain called upon the two augmented crew pilots to assst during the remainder of the flight. While maintaining control of the aircraft, he directed the first officer to handle ATC communications and to accomplish multiple abnomal procedures with the help of the additional first officer. The additional captain maintained communications with the lead flight attendant and company operations as the emergency progressed and later assisted in the passenger evacuation. Fuel dumping began on descent below 10,000 feet. The fuel jettison procedure was complicated as the left dump nozzle appeared inoperative. The crew dumped 160,000 lb of fuel; this action took about 40 minutes. When the fuel dumping was completed, the captain requested vectors for a 20 mile final for runway XX. The crew extended flaps early using alternate procedures due to an abnormal leading edge indication and the FLAPS PRIMARY message ... A final approach speed of Vref + 20 and 25 [degrees] of trailing edge flaps was planned. They selected auto brakes number 4. The weather was still bad with strong, gusty winds and heavy rain causing moderate turbulence during the approach. The ILS approach and landing were normal. At touchdown, maximum reverse was selected on #2 and #3 engines and about half reverse on #4 engine... As the aircraft passed a taxiway turnoff, the tower advised that they saw fire on the left side of the aircraft... This was the first time crew members were aware of any fire... A runway turnoff was used, and the aircraft stopped on a taxiway ... (a difficult but successful evacuation followed). This incident is an example of an electronic system 'nightmare'. The crew received and had to sort out 42 EICAS messages, 12 caution/warning indications, repeated stick shaker activation and abnormal speed reference information on the promary flight display. Many of these indications were conflicting, leading the crew to suspect number one engine problems when that engine was actually functioning normally. There was no indication of fire presented to the crew a fire actually existed...' " (page 155-156)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Billings, C.E. (1996). Human-Centered Aviation Automation: Principles and Guidelines. NASA Technical Memorandum 110381. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. See Resource details

  3.  
  4. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: A widely reported problem in modern aircraft is entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, when under time pressure (e.g. [12]). Pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often, and therefore you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad, that is very distracting; getting the format correct, especially the format that you don’t often use”. (page 5)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Considering temporal aspects for the design of humancomputer collaboration: identifying suitable foci. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/chi%20time%20ws%202004.pdf. See Resource details

  5.  
  6. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: A widely reported problem in modern aircraft is entering instructions through the keypad into the FMS, when under time pressure (e.g. [12]). Pilots have mentioned this issue to us as a particular problem: “...during the high workload phases, operating the FMS, especially the tasks that you don’t do very often, and therefore you might forget to put a slash or a stroke, whatever the format should be that you are typing into the scratchpad, that is very distracting; getting the format correct, especially the format that you don’t often use”. (page 5)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation & FMS
    Source: Bruseberg, A., & Johnson, P. (2004). Considering temporal aspects for the design of humancomputer collaboration: identifying suitable foci. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath. Available at http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~anneb/chi%20time%20ws%202004.pdf. See Resource details

  7.  
  8. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: The PF performed only one housekeeping activity: manipulating the controls of the aircraft systems except for cabin temperature. The PNF performed three activities—manipulating the frequency selectors on the communication radios, manipulating the controls on the communication selector panel, and manipulating the cabin temperature controls—that may be classified as housekeeping activities. Of these four housekeeping activities, only manipulating the cabin temperature controls showed a significant effect of level of cockpit automation (F (3, 188) = 4.02,p< .01). For this activity, only the post hoc comparison of the SP-77 versus the 300e was significant (p <.01). The mean frequencies for each aircraft are given in Table 6. (page 15)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

  9.  
  10. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The commanded-roll failure emulated an AP-commanded roll that exceeded the target bank angle. Analyses for both roll malfunctions and the soft-pitch malfunction are based on time from initial failure to disconnect of the AP by any means (yoke-mounted disconnect, panel disengage, circuit breaker). Times ranged from 1.8 sec to 107.1 sec (means, medians, and ranges are summarized in Table 1). However, 69% of the pilots disconnected within 13 sec of the initial failure and half within 8 sec. These “immediate” disconnects by 18 of the 29 pilots [62%] were defined by sequences in which no other significant actions occurred between failure onset and AP disconnect…Using an RT of 8.7 sec or less as a cutoff value, 93.7% [18 out of 29 pilots or 62 % ] of the sample of immediate responders were included. Eleven pilots [11 out of 29 or 37%] initially chose to manually override the AP prior to their disconnecting the AP, whether by using the control-wheel steering option or by ovirpowering the aileron servo. One extreme outlier was removed, however, reducing the number to 10 [10 out of 29 or 34%] for the examined distribution." (page 160)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  11.  
  12. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Soft roll (roll sensor). The soft roll failure was rated as third in difficulty to diagnose but was rated easiest to correct (by 13 of 26 pilots [50%]). Following removal of one outlier (194 sec) pilot performance was again categorized as immediate disconnect (16 out of 28 or 57%) or manual override (12 out of 28 or 42%). Those categorized as immediate disconnect responses averaged 1 1 .72 sec (range = 4.52-I 6.69), whereas those categorized as manual overrides averaged 37.45 sec after one outlier was removed (range = 13.16-85.14; outlier shown in Figure 2)." (page 161)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  13.  
  14. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Soft pitch (pitch sensor). The soft pitch failure was rated as most difficult to diagnose (by 12 of 26 pilots [46%]) and was rated third easiest to correct, missing a tie fot second by one tally. Performances were again categorized as either immediate disconnect (12 out [of 29 or 41%]) or manual override (17 [out of 29 or 58%]), ... Three pilots never diagnosed the failures [3 out of 29 or 10%,] manually flying the airplane without disconnecting the AP; their scores and one other outlier were removed, leaving 13. Immediate disconnects averaged 17.7 sec (range = 6.5-3 1 .5), and the 13 remaining manual overrides averaged 46.19 (range = 15.2-76.2)." (page 162)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  15.  
  16. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Runaway pitch trim. This failure was different from the others in that only by pulling the pitch trim circuit breaker would the problem be corrected. The interim solution was the AP disconnect/trim interrupt switch. Only three pilots chose the optimal response, depressing and holding the disconnect, then pulling the circuit breaker. Four others depressed and held the disconnect at various times during the recovery. The vast majority of initial responses were yoke AP disconnect (15), followed in frequency by panel-mounted AP-engage switch (5), mode manipulation (2). manual override (2), and pitch trim circuit breaker (1). Data from 4 participants were removed from consideration due to circumstances that contaminated these data. Of the 25 remaining, 21 of the pilots were classified as immediate responders, 2 were classified as manual overriders, and 2 as mode changers. It should also be noted that two pilots never heard the warning tone, possibly due to high-frequency hearing loss, responding only to aircraft performance changes." (page 163)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  17.  
  18. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The commanded-roll failure emulated an AP-commanded roll that exceeded the target bank angle. Analyses for both roll malfunctions and the soft-pitch malfunction are based on time from initial failure to disconnect of the AP by any means (yoke-mounted disconnect, panel disengage, circuit breaker). Times ranged from 1.8 sec to 107.1 sec (means, medians, and ranges are summarized in Table 1). However, 69% of the pilots disconnected within 13 sec of the initial failure and half within 8 sec. These “immediate” disconnects by 18 of the 29 pilots [62%] were defined by sequences in which no other significant actions occurred between failure onset and AP disconnect." (page 160)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  19.  
  20. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Soft roll (roll sensor). The soft roll failure was rated as third in difficulty to diagnose but was rated easiest to correct (by 13 of 26 pilots [50%]). Following removal of one outlier (194 sec) pilot performance was again categorized as immediate disconnect (16 out of 28 or 57%) or manual override (12 out of 28 or 42%). Those categorized as immediate disconnect responses averaged 1 1 .72 sec (range = 4.52-I 6.69), whereas those categorized as manual overrides averaged 37.45 sec after one outlier was removed (range = 13.16-85.14; outlier shown in Figure 2)." (page 161)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  21.  
  22. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Soft pitch (pitch sensor). The soft pitch failure was rated as most difficult to diagnose (by 12 of 26 pilots [46%]) and was rated third easiest to correct, missing a tie fot second by one tally. Performances were again categorized as either immediate disconnect (12 out [of 29 or 41%]) or manual override (17 [out of 29 or 58%]), ... Three pilots never diagnosed the failures [3 out of 29 or 10%,] manually flying the airplane without disconnecting the AP; their scores and one other outlier were removed, leaving 13. Immediate disconnects averaged 17.7 sec (range = 6.5-3 1 .5), and the 13 remaining manual overrides averaged 46.19 (range = 15.2-76.2)." (page 163)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  23.  
  24. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Runaway pitch trim. This failure was different from the others in that only by pulling the pitch trim circuit breaker would the problem be corrected. The interim solution was the AP disconnect/trim interrupt switch. Only three pilots chose the optimal response, depressing and holding the disconnect, then pulling the circuit breaker. Four others depressed and held the disconnect at various times during the recovery. The vast majority of initial responses were yoke AP disconnect (15), followed in frequency by panel-mounted AP-engage switch (5), mode manipulation (2). manual override (2), and pitch trim circuit breaker (1). Data from 4 participants were removed from consideration due to circumstances that contaminated these data. Of the 25 remaining, 21 of the pilots were classified as immediate responders, 2 were classified as manual overriders, and 2 as mode changers. It should also be noted that two pilots never heard the warning tone, possibly due to high-frequency hearing loss, responding only to aircraft performance changes." (page 163)
    Issue: failure assessment may be difficult (Issue #25) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  25.  
  26. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: The remaining two communication activities were concerned with conversations between the two pilots. One represented task-relevant conversation; the other, non-relevant conversation. The mean frequencies are shown in Table 5. A two-way (level of cockpit automation, pilot role) ANACOVA performed on task-relevant conversation showed a main effect of level of cockpit automation (F (3, 188) = 4.71; p <.01). The post hoc comparisons of the SP-77 versus the 300a and of the SP-177 versus the 300a were both significant. Of the variables that we expected to be affected by the length of the climbs and descents, non-relevant conversation was the only one that showed a non-significant effect of the covariate (p = .07). (page 13)
    Issue: inter-pilot communication may be reduced (Issue #139) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

  27.  
  28. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: Four of the 23 activities—hand flying, holding the yoke while the autopilot was engaged, manipulating the thrust levers, and manipulating any of the knobs on the mode control panel—involved controlling the flight path of the aircraft and were performed by the PF. All four of these activities showed significant differences among levels of cockpit automation (see Table 3). Hand flying showed significant differences among aircraft (F (3, 188)=15.57, p< .0001). Differences among aircraft in the amount of time the PF spent holding the yoke while the autopilot was engaged (F (3, 188)=59.57, p< .0001) and manipulating the thrust levers and controls on the mode control panel (F (3, 188)=27.21, 47.84 respectively, p< .0001 for both analyses) were also significant. As shown in Table 3, automation level was generally negatively related to observation of hand flying, holding the yoke, and manipulating the thrust control levers. (page 12)
    Issue: pilot's role may be changed (Issue #144) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

  29.  
  30. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: Because all four variables showed a significant main effect for level of cockpit automation, post-hoc tests using Bonferroni multiple comparisons (alpha = .05) were computed for all four activities (See Table 4). The lowest level of automation (SP-77) was associated with significantly greater frequencies of hand flying than each of the other three aircraft, and the highest level of automation (300e) was associated with significantly lower frequencies of hand flying than each of the other three aircraft. The post-hoc tests demonstrated that the lowest level of automation (SP-77) was associated with significantly greater frequencies of holding the yoke and manipulating the thrust levers than the other three aircraft. For holding the yoke, there were no other significant differences among the three highest levels of automation aircraft. For thrust lever manipulation, there was one other significant pairwise comparison, namely that the second lowest level of automation (SP-177) was associated with greater frequencies of thrust lever activity than the highest level of automation (300e). Finally, automation level was generally positively related to frequency of manipulation of the controls on the mode control panel. The lowest level of automation (SP-77) was associated with a significantly lower frequency of mode control panel activity than the other three aircraft. There were no other significant pairwise differences among the three highest levels of automation for the mode control panel activity. (page 13)
    Issue: pilot's role may be changed (Issue #144) See Issue details
    Strength: +5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

  31.  
  32. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: Overall, however, perhaps the most striking result of this study is that the frequency of many activities did not appear to be related to the level of automation. Of the other 19 activities that were examined in this study, only six showed a significant main effect of the level of cockpit automation and two showed a significant interaction between the level of cockpit automation and pilot role. We can offer three explanations for the lack of significant effects. First, many pilot activities, such as listening to ATIS, should be unrelated to the level of automation (baseline activities). Second, the pilots observed in this study engaged in mixed-fleet flying. As such, they move relatively frequently among aircraft. Mixed-fleet flying may reduce differences in the frequency of various activities among the aircraft because the pilots may develop practices or strategies that are common to all four types of aircraft rather than developing practices or strategies that are optimal for each aircraft. Third, because of the many flight specific variables not included in the design (crew, season of year, day of week, arrival and departure cities, day of flight in trip, leg of flight each day), our tests of cockpit automation are admittedly conservative, with inflated estimates of error variance due to many uncontrolled and unaccounted for variables in the design. Thus, the statistical effects of automation on some activities, such as communicating with ATC, may be difficult to detect. (page 24)
    Issue: pilot's role may be changed (Issue #144) See Issue details
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: B737
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (2005). Pilot Activities and the Level of Cockpit Automation. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 15(3), 251-268. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. See Resource details

  33.  
  34. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "It was apparent from the performances of many of the pilots and from the posttest interviews that the GA pilot population would benefit greatly from training, particularly if it contained both procedures for responding to identifiable malfunctions and a thorough explanation of the workings of the AP system and its interaction with and use of the elevator trim (conceptual model development). Such an effort should lead to a reduction in the frequency of misdiagnoses. Training could also help pilots differentiate between malfunctions that may be safe to fly through (i.e., failure of AP to hold heading) and those that should receive an immediate disconnect." (page 172)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  35.  
  36. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "...initial examination of the questionnaire and interview data indicated that all pilots understood they could manually overpower the AP servos [100%], and 22 were aware of the potential interaction between a runaway pitch trim motor and AP pitch-attitude (elevator servo) inputs [22 out of 29 or 75%]. Four pilots had not considered the potential interaction previously but grasped the concept immediately during the interview [4 out of 29 or 13%]." (page 165)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: -5
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Damos, D.L., John, R.S., & Lyall, E.A. (1999). Changes in pilot activities with increasing automation. In R.S. Jensen, B. Cox, J.D. Callister, & R. Lavis (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 810-815. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  37.  
  38. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: One of the first officers that the author rode jumpseat with "was bothered by the feature involved in programming the computer to cross a fix at a certain speed and altitude. The problem is the computer will achieve the required parameters before the fix. 'You are really never sure if it (the computer) is going to make it or not. And if it is going to mess up, it's too late to do anything,' the pilot said." (page 55)
    Issue: pilots may lack confidence in automation (Issue #46) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B767
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Hughes, D. (March 23, 1992). Automated Cockpits: Keeping Pilots in the Loop - Pilots support 767 automated cockpit, but cite mismatch with ATC system. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 52-55. See Resource details

  39.  
  40. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Workload on the pilot not flying, particularly in a terminal area while the aircraft is being flown manually, can be very high. Britannia Airways Ltd. has used heart rate data to augment subjective pilot ratings of workload. ... Heart rate measurements were taken for crews flying the Boeing 767 and the 737 which have very different levels of automation. Both take-off and landing flight phases, as well as different operating modes, were measured. The difference between the 767 and 737 is illustrated in Figure 9 [which shows a comparision between the heart rate response for the same pilot flying the B737 and the B767] for similar ILS approaches at Luton using the flight director. The heart rate for the 767 approach is about 10 beats/minute lower than for the 737. Figure 10 compares the heart rate responses during standard instrument departures out of Luton. On the 767, the autopilot is engaged at about 500 feet before the aircraft is cleaned up. On the 737, due to noise abatement procedures, the autopilot is engaged after the flaps are retracted and the aircraft is in trim. As a last comparison, Figure 11 shoes the difference in heart rates for different operating modes during a standard instrument departure from Luton in the 767. Compare to hand flying (bottom trace), heart rates are reduced when an autopilot (top trace) is used. Rates are also reduced when a flight director which is driven by the flight management (FMS) is used (middle trace). In summary, for the take-off and approach to landing phase, the Boeing 737 crews had generally higher rates than the 767 crews. However, the rates during the actual flare to touch down flight phase were approximately equal for both aircraft. These heart rates were also higher for actual flight conditions than would be expected in the simulator and this was probably due to an inability to properly simulate the real world, particularly wind conditions." (page 29-31)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: B737 & B767
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Norman, S.D. & Orlady, H.W. (1988). Flightdeck Automation: Promises and Realities. Final Report of a NASA/FAA Industry Workshop. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  41.  
  42. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Although automation has been a clear benefit, some factors were cited which have been involved in incidents with automation. These include: ... Inadequate cockpit discipline and allocation of responsibilities between the pilot-not-flying and the pilot flying" (page 150)
    Issue: pilot control authority may be diffused (Issue #104) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Norman, S.D. & Orlady, H.W. (1988). Flightdeck Automation: Promises and Realities. Final Report of a NASA/FAA Industry Workshop. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  43.  
  44. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: One pilot made the comment "when asked if skill deterioration was more of a problem with ADVTECH aircraft than with other airplanes they had flown (Orlady study): ... 'The automatics are so good and used so often because of the stress on using them. This starts with training because the FAA puts so much stress on it. It's about all they want to see.' " (page 11)
    Issue: automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (Issue #116) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Orlady, H.W. (1989). Training for advanced cockpit technology aircraft. In Proceedings of the Second Regional Safety Foundation Workshop sponsored by China Airlines and the Flight Safety Foundation, March 3-4, 1989, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC. See Resource details

  45.  
  46. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Some pilots have claimed that many of the new pilots are uncomfortable unless they are flying in an automatic mode because that is the only way that they have been trained to use these systems. Overall, there seems to be a consensus that our training has put too much emphasis on the automatics to the neglect [emphasized] of the basic airplane." (page 16-17)
    Issue: deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (Issue #63) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Orlady, H.W. (1989). Training for advanced cockpit technology aircraft. In Proceedings of the Second Regional Safety Foundation Workshop sponsored by China Airlines and the Flight Safety Foundation, March 3-4, 1989, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC. See Resource details

  47.  
  48. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "That automation of the tracking task reduced RT to instrument deviations (although the effect was only significant for one of the tasks) is not surprising. The present results show that automation-induced improvements in responses to other tasks, due to task offloading, can be demonstrated in a moderate-fidelity simulated environment, just as they can be found in lower-fidelity part-task settings (e.g., Parasuraman et al., 1991)." (page 782)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  49.  
  50. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "For all four of the measures [psychophysiological measures], mental workload was higher in the Manual tracking condition than in Automated tracking. This effect was not significant at the .05 level for the IBI measure [F(1,11)=1.08, p=.32], but did attain significance for HRV [F(1,11)=35.93, p=.0001] and .10HZ [F(1,11)=7.34, p=.02], and approached significance for RSA [F(1,11)=4.18, p=.07]." (page 782)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  51.  
  52. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "As hypothesized, response times were generally increased by time-on-task and/or by Manual (as compared to Automated) tracking. However, the pattern of statistical significance differed, depending on which instrument was being responded to. RTs to NAV1 deflections grew slower as a function of time on-task, with decrements occurring as early as the second five-minute period of a session. This task was not, however, significantly slowed by the need to manually maintain heading. Resets of the AI failures, though, were unaffected by time-on-task. Instead, this task was impaired by the Manual tracking condition, which saw participants taking on average almost twice as long to respond to this event as they took during Automated tracking." (page 782)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Palmer, E.A. & Mitchell, C.M. (1997). Models, methods, and metrics: A structured approach for the evaluation and redesign of autoflight system interfaces. In R.S. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 965-970. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. See Resource details

  53.  
  54. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "An example of such an inadvertent mode activation contributed to a major recent accident in the aviation domain (the Bangalore crash; e.g., Lenorovitz, 1990). In that case, the pilot put the automation into a mode called OPEN DESCENT during an approach without realizing it. In this mode, airspeed is controlled by pitch rather than thrust, i.e., throttles go to idle. In the desirable mode for this phase of flight, i.e. in SPEED mode, airspeed is controlled by thrust. As a consequence of going into OPEN DESCENT, the aircraft could not sustain the glidepath and maintain the pilot-selected target speed at the same time. The flight director bars commanded the pilot to fly the aircraft well below the required profile to try to maintain airspeed. It was not until 10 seconds before impact that the crew discovered what had happened; too late for them to recover with engines at idle. How could this happen? One contributing factor in this accident may have been that there are at least five different ways of activating the OPEN DESCENT mode." (page 5-6)
    Issue: automation may be too complex (Issue #40) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: A320
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1995). How in the World Did We Ever Get into That Mode? Mode Error and Awareness in Supervisory Control. Human Factors, 37(1), 5-19. See Resource details

  55.  
  56. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  57.  
  58. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of who is in charge and what are the currently active target values ... difficulties in tracking active target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of 'what the automation is doing'." (page 314-317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  59.  
  60. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Many examples of inadequate feedback occurred in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] including difficulties integrating data on FMS status distributed over different cockpit displays or CDU pages, difficulties anticipating uncommanded mode changes, difficulties assessing the implications of changes to the instructions given to the FMS (e.g., enroute changes in cruise speed may interact with pre-programmed values for the descent phase on a different CDU page), difficulties visualizing the descent profile programmed in VNAV." (page 317)
    Issue: behavior of automation may not be apparent (Issue #83) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  61.  
  62. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Most Frequently Observed Problems ... Awareness of automatic transition to ALT HOLD mode upon level-off, and requirements to reengage a climb mode for subsequent altitude change" (page 315)
    Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  63.  
  64. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The FMS training that we observed emphasized a bottom-up approach oriented towards proficiency in specific tasks by providing 'recipes' for system operation. The result that most of the difficulties in the corpus [which includes both this study and the study referenced by s0069] involved non-standard situations and complex interactions of FMS subsystems seems to suggest that a top-down approach would be desirable as an addition or complement. If pilots were provided with an overall mental representation of the functional structure of the FMS, they would be better able to manage and utilize the automated systems in unusual or novel situations. Given that their role has shifted towards the detection of deviations from the expected and towards troubleshooting and managing such situations, this capability seems to be very important for pilots in highly automated aircraft." (page 320)
    Issue: training may be inadequate (Issue #133) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  65.  
  66. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "... the training observations indicate that pilots do not perceive the FMS as one large integrated system consisting of a variety of closely related, interacting subsystems such as the MCP or the CDU. ... Our data show that pilots think of and operationally use the MCP and CDU as, at least two different systems." (page 318)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  67.  
  68. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Frequently, pilots were able to describe FMS behavior during standard operations. ... But the same pilot would have difficulties applying this knowledge to a specific and more complicated operational situation, e.g. an aborted takeoff." (page 315)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  69.  
  70. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Another common factor implicated in many of the problems noted in the corpus is incomplete or buggy mental models of how various modes of the FMS work and especially how they interact with each other in different flight contexts." (page 317)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  71.  
  72. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "During the last three training sessions ..., pilot errors and questions focused on gaps in their understanding of the underlying functional structure of the FMS. Table 6 provides an overview of the most frequently encountered problems and questions. ... TABLE 6 Most Frequently Observed Problems ... Pilots often indicated that they were not sure whether there were other ways of achieving a goal or how to choose among multiple methods" (page 315)
    Issue: understanding of automation may be inadequate (Issue #105) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  73.  
  74. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Most Frequently Observed Problems ... Visualization of FMS-calculated vertical profile" (page 315)
    Issue: vertical profile visualization may be difficult (Issue #53) See Issue details
    Strength: +3
    Aircraft: B737-300
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Sarter, N.B. & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: Operational experiences with the Flight Management System. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. See Resource details

  75.  
  76. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "7. COMMUNICATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY ... Primary Flight Display (PFD) The former electromechanical instruments had an inherent lack of flexibility because of the physical necessity to spread information on several instruments of the pilot's panels. The successor to the ADI [Altitude Direction Indicator], the PFD is basically used for short term flight path monitoring and at first glance it shows the aircraft aerodynamic situation i.e. attitude, speed and status of guidance system. Communication to the crew of the main parameters displayed on the same full colour, shadow mask, high resolution EFIS CRT reduces the need to scan a large area of instruments, but without concentrating the information to the 'hypnosis point'. Crew mental workload was shown to be reduced by the new, more direct process of information assimilation" (page 7)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: -1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Speyer, J.J. & Fort, A.P. (1983). Communications: Major Human Factor in Cockpit Design. SAE Technical Paper Series. Long Beach, CA: Society of Automotive Engineers. See Resource details

  77.  
  78. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Workload management, or lack of it, is illustrated by the following ASRS report. [ASRS incident report #167993] Narrative: passing ARNES on CIVET 2 profile descent, we both (2 man crew) thought we were cleared after passing FUELR for the 25L ILS approach with a sidestep to runway 24R. Approach later asked if we had the airport and we reported we did and we both thought we were cleared for a visual to runway 24R. We switched the ILS to 24R and turned in that direction. Alt was 4000' and descending, the Approach told us to turn 20 deg left and that we had traffic to our right. He apparently was turning into runway 24R. Approach said our original clearance was for runway 25R, not for runway 25R. Apparently we misheard the clearance. Contributing factors: tuning in a runway and being forced to changed to another runway while trying to make altitude restrictions etc. Also flying an automated, glass cockpit aircraft in this environment pushes workload to the limit, when having to change runways on final, forcing you to reprogram the computer, re-tune the nav radios and change VHF freq and change charts. It becomes very easy to misunderstand clearances. Also no one had time to look for other traffic." (page 13-14)
    Issue: automation may adversely affect pilot workload (Issue #79) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  79.  
  80. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "Another factor to be considered is the rapid expansion of automation in the cockpit. Many in the aviation industry have assumed that automation would remove human error, replacing the fallible human with unerring devices. The research of Wiener and Curry, including field studies with airlines bringing highly automated aircraft on line, suggests that this may be overly optimistic, and that possibly increases the severity of its consequences (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1885a, 1985c, 19988a; 1989a,b; Wiener and Curry, 1980). The same appears to be true in the other industries mentioned. In brief, computer-controlled flight may invite large blunders while eliminating the small errors seen in manual systems. The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. ... [ASRS incident report #141226] Narrative: Aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield, aircraft at 5000'. I identified localizer. As per company procedures captain rotated heading (HDG) select knob to 340 deg for missed approach HDG, but unknown to either of us, the multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate "HDG Hold" I did not notice the flight mode annunciator window change From "LOC TRK" to "HDG HLD". Of course, the ADI (flight director) display remained as before with the pitch bar giving altitude hold at 5000' And the back bar still centered but centered because we were On HDG not localizer. Obviously we gradually started to drift right. The HSI (nav display) was selected on map mode (20 mile scale). On this scale a small deviation off localizer is too small to detect. I monitored the glide slope (raw data display) and saw it descend through the flight director pitch bar. I looked at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I immediately announced to the captain and disconnected the autopilot to start descent and selected arc mode on the nav display. I saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I put in about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment Atlanta Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until established. (He also gave us a HDG to correct). I leveled at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious. Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor. Hdg select knob doubles as HDG hold button and an imperceptible extra push in on it activates HDG hold. To correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally, multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted to activate the wrong function. (We have 3 multifunction knobs where different functions are activated depending on how far you push the knob. It can be very tricky sometimes)." (page 4-6)
    Issue: controls of automation may be poorly designed (Issue #37) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight: autopilot
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  81.  
  82. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. Narrative: We were cleared to cross 40 nm west of LINDEN VOR to maintain FL270. The Captain and I began [to] discuss the best methods to program the CDU to allow the performance management system to descend the aircraft. We had a difference of opinion on how to best accomplish this task (since we are trained to use all possible on-board performance systems). We wanted to use the aircraft's capabilities to its fullest. As a result, a late descent was started using conventional autopilot capabilities (vert spd, max indicated Mach/airspeed, and spd brakes). Near the end of descent, the aircraft was descending at 340 KIAS and 6000 FPM rate of descent. The aircraft crossed the fix approximately 250-500 feet high. Unfortunately we made no call to ATC to advise them of the possibility of not meeting the require [in sic] alt/fix. This possible altitude excursion resulted because: 1) The captain. [in sic] and the F/O had differences of opinion on how best to program the descent; A) Both thought their method was the best, the captain's of programming (fooling) the computer to believe anti-ice would be used during descent, which starts the descent earlier. The F/O's of subtracting 5 miles from the nav fix and programming the computer to cross 5 miles prior to LINDEN at FL270. B) A minor personality clash between the captain and the F/O brought about by differences of opinion on general discipline. C) Time wasted by both captain and F/O (especially F/O) in incorrectly programming CDU and FMS for descent, which obviously wasted time at level flight, which should have been used for descent. Observation: as a pilot for a large commercial carrier at its largest base, we seldom fly with the same cockpit crew member. This normally does not create a problem. I do, however, feel that with approximately 6 years, which can cause a bit more difficult transition than, say month to month cockpit crew change on a 727 or pre-EFIS DC-9. I have flown commercially for 10 years, and have flown 2-man crew for 8 of those 10. The toughest transition for me is to determine who shares the PF and PNF duties. This historically (3 years) has been the most difficult when the other crew member has transferred from a 3-man cockpit to a 2-man 'glass cockpit.' This is especially pertinent when the crew member has been on a 3-man crew for a number of years. As F/O, when you are the PNF, you accomplish your normal duties. However, often times when one is the PF, the F/O also has to do the PNF duties because the other crew member has not been used to doing the PNF duties to the extent that is required on 2-man cockpits, whether they be conventional or EFIS. This obviously can lead to a myriad of problems. Add weather or an airport such as Washington National, LaGuardia, or Orange County, and such problems can accelerate with alarming rapidity. (ASRS No. 122778)" (page 5-6)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  83.  
  84. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The problems of crew interaction with keyboard data entry can be seen in the following ASRS report. Narrative: while preparing for departure, the captain loaded incorrect position coordinates in the IRS pos. Instead of a correct position of approximately N 50 deg 15 mins, E 00 deg 01 mins, he loaded N 50 deg 15 mins W 00 deg 01 mins. Contributing factors. Rushing to beat a noise curfew; short layover; lack of crew coordination and cross check. This resulted in a NAV map shift of approximately 30 mi. The problem was discovered on initial departure when radar told us we weren't proceeding on the proper course. The problem was discovered quickly and no conflict occurred. We switched to manual nav. However, we couldn't continue our ocean crossing and diverted to Shannon, Ireland, where we made an overweight landing. Human performance considerations: although the captain was supposed to be giving me a nav check he rapidly and without asking for verification programmed the computers himself. We had sufficient time to do the job right but didn't take it. I should have cross checked our position. But didn't. (It isn't in our nav checklist to do so). (ASRS No. 150785)" (page 30-31)
    Issue: crew coordination problems may occur (Issue #84) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: autoflight
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  85.  
  86. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "After departing from SJC and completing the first part of the LOUPE departure (which in itself was at that time a tangled procedure creating a workload problem in any aircraft; it has since been somewhat simplified), the following clearance was issued: 'After Wilson Creek, direct 37 degrees 45 minutes north, 111 degrees 05 minutes west, direct Farmington, as filed.' ... When the crew attempted to create the waypoint by entering the coordinates (latitude, lat; and longitude, lon) into the Legs page of the CDU, they experienced considerable trouble due to the fact that the sequence of the clearance did not conform to the format required by the CDU. For example the clearance as transmitted places the hemisphere ('N' and 'W') after the coordinates; the CDU demands that it come first. The crew tried one format after another, with growing frustration. Both were 'heads down' in the cockpit for a considerable time trying various formats for data entry. At one point the crew's input of the coordinates had five errors of three different types. Finally, the captain arrived at a solution: he told the first officer to fly the plane while he searched through other pages in the CDU, hoping to find the correct format for a lat and lon waypoint to use as a model. His solution represented true 'resource management.' Information readily at hand, several CDU pages containing lat/lon formats for another purpose, was used to solve the problem. In brief, the unexpected and unfamiliar lat and lon waypoint created a high workload and a compelling demand for effective crew coordination. Just why the controller felt the need to issue a lat and lon waypoint, when he could have given bearing and distance off of a nearby VOR (which is easy to enter into the CDU), is not clear. In issuing such a complex clearance, the controller was not only burdening the crew but was also making trouble for himself." (page 223-224)
    Issue: data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (Issue #112) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Crew coordination and training in the advanced technology cockpit. In Wiener, E.L. , Kanki, B.G., & Helmreich, R.L. (Eds.), Cockpit resource management, 199-229. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. See Resource details

  87.  
  88. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. ... [ASRS incident report #141226] Narrative: Aircraft was coupled to autopilot and autopilot was armed for the ILS (8L at Atlanta). Aircraft intercepted and captured localizer at approximately 15 nm from airfield, aircraft at 5000'. I identified localizer. As per company procedures captain rotated heading (HDG) select knob to 340 deg for missed approach HDG, but unknown to either of us, the multifunction knob was pushed in far enough to activate 'HDG Hold' I did not notice the flight mode annunciator window change From 'LOC TRK' to 'HDG HLD'. Of course, the ADI (flight director) display remained as before with the pitch bar giving altitude hold at 5000' And the back bar still centered but centered because we were On HDG not localizer. Obviously we gradually started to drift right. The HSI (nav display) was selected on map mode (20 mile scale). On this scale a small deviation off localizer is too small to detect. I monitored the glide slope (raw data display) and saw it descend through the flight director pitch bar. I looked at the flight mode annunciator (FMA) and realized we were no longer armed for the ILS. I immediately announced to the captain and disconnected the autopilot to start descent and selected arc mode on the nav display. I saw we were full scale localizer deflection so I put in about a 15 deg correction to course. At that moment Atlanta Approach called to tell us we were drifting into the parallel ILS course and he told us to maintain 4500' until established. (He also gave us a HDG to correct). I leveled at 4700' and as I did the localizer centered up and the ILS was resumed uneventfully. Having map mode in HSI instead of arc does not make a localizer deviation immediately obvious. Lack of continuous cross-check of FMA by pilots is a factor. Hdg select knob doubles as HDG hold button and an imperceptible extra push in on it activates HDG hold. To correct the problem: fly ILS with arc (or rose) in map to make deviations immediately obvious. Additionally, multifunction knobs should not be accepted on aircraft. It is simply too easy at night when you are tired or distracted to activate the wrong function. (We have 3 multifunction knobs where different functions are activated depending on how far you push the knob. It can be very tricky sometimes)." (page 5-6)
    Issue: displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (Issue #92) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  89.  
  90. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The ASRS reports below are illustrative of some of the problems of autoflight. Narrative: We were cleared to cross 40 nm west of LINDEN VOR to maintain FL270. The Captain and I began [to] discuss the best methods to program the CDU to allow the performance management system to descend the aircraft. We had a difference of opinion on how to best accomplish this task (since we are trained to use all possible on-board performance systems). We wanted to use the aircraft's capabilities to its fullest. As a result, a late descent was started using conventional autopilot capabilities (vert spd, max indicated Mach/airspeed, and spd brakes). Near the end of descent, the aircraft was descending at 340 KIAS and 6000 FPM rate of descent. The aircraft crossed the fix approximately 250-500 feet high. Unfortunately we made no call to ATC to advise them of the possibility of not meeting the require [in sic] alt/fix. This possible altitude excursion resulted because: 1) The captain. [in sic] and the F/O had differences of opinion on how best to program the descent; A) Both thought their method was the best, the captain's of programming (fooling) the computer to believe anti-ice would be used during descent, which starts the descent earlier. The F/O's of subtracting 5 miles from the nav fix and programming the computer to cross 5 miles prior to LINDEN at FL270. B) A minor personality clash between the captain and the F/O brought about by differences of opinion on general discipline. C) Time wasted by both captain and F/O (especially F/O) in incorrectly programming CDU and FMS for descent, which obviously wasted time at level flight, which should have been used for descent. Observation: as a pilot for a large commercial carrier at its largest base, we seldom fly with the same cockpit crew member. This normally does not create a problem. I do, however, feel that with approximately 6 years, which can cause a bit more difficult transition than, say month to month cockpit crew change on a 727 or pre-EFIS DC-9. I have flown commercially for 10 years, and have flown 2-man crew for 8 of those 10. The toughest transition for me is to determine who shares the PF and PNF duties. This historically (3 years) has been the most difficult when the other crew member has transferred from a 3-man cockpit to a 2-man 'glass cockpit.' This is especially pertinent when the crew member has been on a 3-man crew for a number of years. As F/O, when you are the PNF, you accomplish your normal duties. However, often times when one is the PF, the F/O also has to do the PNF duties because the other crew member has not been used to doing the PNF duties to the extent that is required on 2-man cockpits, whether they be conventional or EFIS. This obviously can lead to a myriad of problems. Add weather or an airport such as Washington National, LaGuardia, or Orange County, and such problems can accelerate with alarming rapidity. (ASRS No. 122778)" (page 5)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: FMS
    Source: Wiener, E.L. (1993). Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error. NASA Contractor Report NCA2-441. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center. See Resource details

  91.  
  92. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "The discussions that evolved were informative and contributed to this report. Several issues relevant to the various questionnaire sections were discussed. Some pertinent comments and findings are stated below: ... Crew Coordination ... 'Biggest complaint, the number one complaint is the breakdown in communication [among crew members].' " (page 246)
    Issue: inter-pilot communication may be reduced (Issue #139) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment: automation
    Source: Wise, J.A., Abbott, D.W., Tilden, D., Dyck, J.L., Guide, P.C., & Ryan, L. (1993). Automation in Corporate Aviation: Human Factors Issues. CAAR-15406-93-1. Daytona Beach, FL: Center for Aviation/Aerospace Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. See Resource details

  93.  
  94. Evidence Type: Excerpt from Observational Study
    Evidence: "In this and in other studies we have observed practitioners adapt information technology provided for them to the immediate tasks at hand in a locally pragmatic way, and usually in ways not anticipated by the designers of the information technology." (page 191)
    Issue: workarounds may be necessary (Issue #107) See Issue details
    Strength: +1
    Aircraft: unspecified
    Equipment:
    Source: Woods, D.D. (1993). Price of flexibility in intelligent interfaces. Knowledge-Based Systems, 6(4)., 189-196. See Resource details
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