This page lists the issues identified in our study in alphabetical order of abbreviated issue statement. Each issue is linked to a page containing its complete issue statement and the evidence related to it found in the analysis of our flight deck automation expert survey.

A
automation behavior may be unexpected and unexplained (issue108)	EVIDENCE
automation information in manuals may be inadequate (issue140)	EVIDENCE
automation integration may be poor (issue011)	EVIDENCE
automation level decisions may be difficult (issue103)	EVIDENCE
automation may adversely affect pilot workload (issue079)	EVIDENCE
automation may be over-emphasized in pilot evaluation (issue116)	EVIDENCE
automation may be too complex (issue040)	EVIDENCE
automation may demand attention (issue102)	EVIDENCE
automation may lack reasonable functionality (issue109)	EVIDENCE
automation may not work well under unusual conditions (issue150)	EVIDENCE
automation may use different control strategies than pilots (issue122)	EVIDENCE
automation performance may be limited (issue126)	EVIDENCE
automation requirements may conflict (issue160)	EVIDENCE
automation skills may be lost (issue137)	EVIDENCE
automation use may slow pilot responses (issue161)	EVIDENCE
automation use philosophy may be lacking (issue101)	EVIDENCE
B
behavior of automation may not be apparent (issue083)	EVIDENCE
both pilots' attention simultaneously diverted by programming (issue075)	EVIDENCE
C
commercial incentives may dominate (issue127)	EVIDENCE
communication between computers may be unsupervised (issue022)	EVIDENCE
complex automation may have overly simplistic interface (issue128)	EVIDENCE
controls of automation may be poorly designed (issue037)	EVIDENCE
crew assignment may be inappropriate (issue142)	EVIDENCE
crew coordination problems may occur (issue084)	EVIDENCE
cross checking may be difficult (issue072)	EVIDENCE
cultural differences may not be considered (issue165)	EVIDENCE
D
data access may be difficult (issue047)	EVIDENCE
data entry and programming may be difficult and time consuming (issue112)	EVIDENCE
data entry errors on keyboards may occur (issue071)	EVIDENCE
data presentation may be too abstract (issue087)	EVIDENCE
data re-entry may be required (issue049)	EVIDENCE
database may be erroneous or incomplete (issue110)	EVIDENCE
deficiencies in basic aircraft training may exist (issue063)	EVIDENCE
displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed (issue092)	EVIDENCE
F
failure assessment may be difficult (issue025)	EVIDENCE
failure modes may be unanticipated by designers (issue024)	EVIDENCE
failure recovery may be difficult (issue023)	EVIDENCE
false alarms may be frequent (issue070)	EVIDENCE
fatigue may be induced (issue156)	EVIDENCE
flightdeck automation may be incompatible with ATC system (issue082)	EVIDENCE
function allocation may be difficult (issue117)	EVIDENCE
H
human-centered design philosophy may be lacking (issue100)	EVIDENCE
I
inadvertent autopilot disengagement may be too easy (issue123)	EVIDENCE
information integration may be required (issue009)	EVIDENCE
information overload may exist (issue014)	EVIDENCE
information processing load may be increased (issue119)	EVIDENCE
instructor training requirements may be inadequate (issue143)	EVIDENCE
insufficient information may be displayed (issue099)	EVIDENCE
interface may be poorly designed (issue039)	EVIDENCE
inter-pilot communication may be reduced (issue139)	EVIDENCE
J
job satisfaction may be reduced (issue013)	EVIDENCE
M
manual operation may be difficult after transition from automated control (issue055)	EVIDENCE
manual skills may be lost (issue065)	EVIDENCE
manual skills may not be acquired (issue007)	EVIDENCE
mode awareness may be lacking (issue095)	EVIDENCE
mode selection may be incorrect (issue145)	EVIDENCE
mode transitions may be uncommanded (issue044)	EVIDENCE
monitoring requirements may be excessive (issue005)	EVIDENCE
N
new tasks and errors may exist (issue089)	EVIDENCE
non-automated pilot tasks may not be integrated (issue153)	EVIDENCE
O
older pilots may be less accepting of automation (issue132)	EVIDENCE
operational knowledge may be lacking in design (issue121)	EVIDENCE
P
pilot control authority may be diffused (issue104)	EVIDENCE
pilot selection may be more difficult (issue136)	EVIDENCE
pilots have responsibility but may lack authority (issue012)	EVIDENCE
pilots may be out of the loop (issue002)	EVIDENCE
pilots may be overconfident in automation (issue131)	EVIDENCE
pilots may be reluctant to assume control (issue026)	EVIDENCE
pilots may lack confidence in automation (issue046)	EVIDENCE
pilots may not be involved in equipment selection (issue141)	EVIDENCE
pilots may over-rely on automation (issue106)	EVIDENCE
pilots may under-rely on automation (issue146)	EVIDENCE
pilot's role may be changed (issue144)	EVIDENCE
planning requirements may be increased (issue158)	EVIDENCE
procedures may assume automation (issue151)	EVIDENCE
protections may be lost though pilots continue to rely on them (issue015)	EVIDENCE
S
scan pattern may change (issue038)	EVIDENCE
similarity may be superficial (issue149)	EVIDENCE
situation awareness may be reduced (issue114)	EVIDENCE
software versions may proliferate (issue134)	EVIDENCE
standardization may be lacking (issue138)	EVIDENCE
state prediction may be lacking (issue152)	EVIDENCE
T
testing may be inadequate (issue115)	EVIDENCE
traffic coordination requirements may increase (issue148)	EVIDENCE
training may be inadequate (issue133)	EVIDENCE
transitioning between aircraft may increase errors (issue130)	EVIDENCE
transitioning between aircraft may increase training requirements (issue129)	EVIDENCE
U
understanding of automation may be inadequate (issue105)	EVIDENCE
V
vertical profile visualization may be difficult (issue053)	EVIDENCE
W
workarounds may be necessary (issue107)	EVIDENCE